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ABSTRACT 
A SIMULATION EXPERIMENTAL STUDY ON  
THE UTILITY OF PAY CHANGES 
by 
YE Liu 
Master of Philosophy 
In this thesis, we conduct an experimental simulation of 131 students from a 
university in Hong Kong and investigate the relationship between pay changes and the 
perceived values (i.e., utility). Applying traditional psychophysical methods, we 
measure the utility of pay changes (i.e., pay raises and pay cuts) of different sizes by 
individual responses (i.e., happiness/unhappiness). Drawing on utility theory and 
expectancy theory, we examine the function that best fits this relationship by 
considering common function forms including linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and 
power functions. Using regression techniques, we find that a quadratic function best 
fits the data, and the utility function is concave in the pay change. When we examine 
the best form of utility functions for pay raises and pay cuts separately, we find that 
the utility of pay raises and that of pay cuts are best described by a quadratic function 
and a linear function, respectively. We further show that a single model involving all 
pay changes better describes the utility than two separate models for pay raises and 
pay cuts. In addition, our best-fit utility model reveals that a sufficiently small amount 
of pay increase may generate a negative value of utility, and we calculate the 
percentage of smallest meaningful pay increase that results in non-negative utility. We 
also discuss the theoretical contributions of our findings to the literature and their 
implications to practitioners. 
Keywords: pay change, utility function, pay raise/cut, regression, experiment.  
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1 INTRODUCTION 
In the past decade, organizations have increasingly emphasized on compensation 
schemes and pay satisfaction. According to the U.S. Bureau of Economic Analysis 
(2003), employee compensation is one of the largest costs of doing business, 
representing 57 percent of the total value of goods and services produced in the United 
States in 2002. As noted by Dreher et al. (1988), there is the expectation that the 
relation between compensation and work outcomes is mediated by attitudinal reactions 
to pay. Thus, pay satisfaction may be regarded as a necessary but not a sufficient 
condition for organizations to achieve the goals of their compensation systems, such 
as employee retention and motivation. 
In the fields of organizational behavior and economics, pay level and its outcomes are 
important concepts. Extant publications have provided insights into the effects of pay 
level, merit pay, and performance on satisfaction. Merit pay is significantly associated 
with employee motivation, performance, and satisfaction (e.g., Jenkins et al. 1998, 
Gerhart and Rynes 2003, Green and Heywood 2008). And there are studies indicating 
that pay raises apparently have a positive impact on employee outcomes including 
behavioral intentions, performance, and satisfaction (Heneman 1992, Jenkins et al. 
1998, Nyberg et al. 2016).  
Various utility functions have been developed to quantify the subjective value of 
different pay levels. For example, Heneman et al. (1997) regarded the true utility as a 
real number on a cardinal scale, and indicated that a power function explained pay 
satisfaction variance treated by pay level better than a linear function. In this thesis, 
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integrating relevant theories from the fields of organizational behavior and economics, 
we investigate the utility function of pay changes in the context of employment. 
Pay satisfaction can be viewed as the “amount of overall positive or negative affect (or 
feelings) that individuals have toward their pay” (Miceli and Lane 1990). In economics, 
utility is regarded as a measure of preferences that represents the satisfaction 
experienced by the consumer of a good. To some extent, the practical meaning of 
“utility” in the context of employment is pay satisfaction.  
1.1 Motivation and Objectives 
Many practitioners have examined the relationship between pay raises and satisfaction 
or the relationship between pay level and satisfaction. Pay satisfaction is positively 
related to the level of pay (Diener et al. 1999, Malka and Chatman 2003, Diener and 
Seligman 2004, Williams et al. 2007). Economists and researchers have investigated 
the utility function of income/pay level or pay increase (Giles and Barrett 1971, 
Schuster et al. 1973, Worley et al. 1992, Heneman et al. 1997, Porter et al. 1990). Mitra 
et al. (2015) considered the effect of pay cuts, and identified the form of utility of pay 
raises and that of disutility of pay cuts. 
In addition, some researchers argued that there is a pay raise threshold. The point at 
which individuals begin to react to pay raises is called the smallest meaningful pay 
increase (SMPI). Since the economic costs of small pay increases may be high for an 
organization, there is an increasing attention from researchers on this threshold of pay 
raise. If pay increases are not large enough to be perceived as attractive by individual 
employees, the economic benefits expected from increased motivation or productivity 
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may not materialize. Then the organization will suffer from the cost of spending a lot 
of money for nothing. The effect of pay increases therefore represents an important 
subject for research. 
In short, we can find research gaps between the practice and the literature. First, very 
little research has investigated individual reactions to pay cuts. Researchers have 
focused on the consequences of pay increases, not pay cuts. However, in practice, the 
increasing volatility in stock option value, especially the pay cuts, can lead to 
significant reduction in overall pay for managers; during the recent recession, many 
companies implemented pay cuts instead of opting for lay-offs (Mitra et al. 2015). 
Gerlach et al. (2006) conducted a study in North America and Germany showed that 
wage-cuts were treated as fairer when the company incurs losses and is not profitable, 
compared to the time when the company makes a positive profit. This reinforces the 
finding from the literature that the cause of a wage-cut is important for its assessment. 
Therefore, studying the reactions to pay cuts is as important as that to pay raises. 
Although Mitra et al. (2015) investigated the disutility of pay cuts, they only 
considered two separate utility functions for the positive limb and negative limb, 
respectively, but they didn’t investigate the case of a single model. Moreover, the effect 
of a very small pay increase is often ignored in the study of pay satisfaction, or 
perceived value (i.e., utility) of pay changes, especially, the study of utility function. 
Both theories in organizational behavior and economics have been used in previous 
researches on the relationship between objective raises in pay and subjective 
assessments of the influences of those raises, but have rarely been used together to 
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frame a single research study. 
In this study, we attempt to fill in these research gaps by addressing three issues. We 
conducted an experimental simulation to measure the utility of pay change, and 
identified the suitable utility function among the linear, quadratic, logarithmic, and 
power function forms. Secondly, we examined the best form of utility functions for 
pay raises and pay cuts separately, and compared the relative validity of the single 
function that best fits our data to those two separated utility forms. Finally, we 
investigated the influence of a very small pay raise on subjects’ responses to pay 
changes, and through the observation of the suitable utility function, we calculated the 
size of pay raise thresholds. 
Therefore, this thesis makes the following contributions. First, it adds to the study of 
utility of pay changes by combining both pay cuts and pay raises and empirically 
supports the use of a single function for the utility of pay changes. Secondly, the 
estimated SMPI implies that in order to generate positive behavioral and affective 
responses at the lowest cost, management should consider rewarding their employees 
with pay increases beyond a certain level. 
1.2 Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis consists of six sections. Section 1 introduces the background and 
motivation for this research as well as research objectives. Section 2 reviews the 
relevant literature including the theoretical background for our research. Section 3 
discusses the preliminaries for the development of utility function. Sections 4 and 5 
describe the methodology, analytical approach, and results of this study. Finally, 
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Section 6 discusses the theoretical contributions, practical implications, and limitations 
of this study as well as the directions for future research. 
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2 LITERATURE REVIEW  
This study integrates the theories from economics and organizational behavior. Thus, 
our literature review consists of two parts. First, we review the economics literature. 
Then, we review publications that concern the relationship between pay and 
satisfaction in the psychophysical perspective.  
2.1 Utility Theory 
In this section we review the development of utility theory to provide a theoretical 
framework for addressing the research questions in this study. We then describe the 
concept of utility of money, including its conceptualization and the related descriptive 
theories. In addition, we present two forms of utility and empirical approaches to the 
measurement of utility. 
The term of “utility” 
The term of “utility” was brought by Daniel Bernoulli to explain the St. Petersburg 
paradox. This paradox was first proposed by Nicholas Bernoulli in 1713. In 1738, 
Bernoulli argued that the paradox could be resolved if decision-makers displayed risk 
aversion and argued for a logarithmic cardinal utility function. He presented the 
distinction between wealth and utility in his paper: Exposition of a New Theory on the 
Measurement of Risk, which serves as the basis for the economic theory of risk 
aversion, risk premium, and utility. Then, at the beginning of the nineteenth century, 
Jeremy Bentham provided the principle of utility. “The utility,” he stated, “is meant 
that property in any object, whereby it tends to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, 
good, or happiness - (all this in the present case comes to the same thing) or (what 
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comes again to the same thing) to prevent the happening of mischief, pain, evil, or 
unhappiness to the party whose interest is considered.” This means the “principle of 
utility” is the principle that actions are to be judged by their usefulness in this sense: 
their tendency to produce benefit, advantage, pleasure, good, or happiness. This 
principle of utility, introduced by Jeremy Bentham, was to be understood much more 
broadly in economics. Jevons announced that Bentham's definition of “utility” 
perfectly expresses the meaning of the term in Economy (1871).  
In the long history the economical meaning of “utility” shifted many times. Since the 
interpretation of an author’s intentions is often debatable, it is difficult to build an 
authoritative history of utility in meaning. Some but not all illustrations of “utility” are 
listed. Jevons (1879) quoted Bentham's sense and thought “utility” definitely meant 
usefulness. Marshall (1961) illustrated that, “the total utility of a thing to anyone (that 
is, the total pleasure or other benefit it yields to him) increases with every increase of 
his stock of it, but not as fast as his stock increases”. Principles of Economics was the 
dominant economic textbook in England for many years at that time. The book 
proposed the ideas of marginal utility. Marshall (1961) thought utility is “the 
satisfaction or benefit derived by consuming a product, thus the marginal utility of a 
good or service is the change in the utility from increase or decrease in the consumption 
of that good or service”.  
The studies of utility can make enormous contributions in both economic and social 
developments. Many mathematicians, economists, and philosophers have been keen 
on the study of utility (Broome 1991). The utility theory has won a place in economics. 
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The development of utility theory 
Utility theory has been widely used for studying how consumers can allocate their 
income among various goods and services in order to achieve the maximization of 
their satisfaction (Stigler 1950). The beginning of the modern utility theory can be 
traced back to the 1870’s, when Jevons first criticized the Ricardian theory and then 
popularized the Bentham’s concepts of utility. Jevons thought Ricardos’ labor value 
theory lacked generality. He emphasized that economic theory is a kind of computation 
of pleasure and pain, and showed that a rational person should make his or her 
consumption decision by considering increased pleasure of adding each item (the 
marginal utility). At that time, many utilitarians believed that utility was a 
psychological base, in existence, and can be directly measured, like the length and the 
temperature. These utilitarians concluded the establishment of diminishing marginal 
utility through their own feelings and emotions.  
Then, Menger from Austria and Walras from France took fundamentally the same 
position of Jevons. These three neoclassical economists are the representative of the 
school of marginal utility theory. The school of marginal utility has made a great 
development at the end of the nineteenth century. On one hand, the study of marginal 
utility has been systematized; on the other hand, this utility theory was expanded in 
subareas, achieving further generalization. 
Expected utility theory is another branch of utility theory that takes account of 
uncertainty. In the 1950s, Von Neumann and Morgenstem provided the analytical 
framework in which a rational actor makes a decision in a condition of uncertainty. 
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Expected utility theory deals with the analysis of choices among risky projects with 
multiple (possibly multidimensional) outcomes. Other concepts of utility (such as 
“experienced utility” and “decision utility”) and two types of utility functions (e.g., 
cardinal and ordinal) have been suggested to analyze a person’s choice behaviors in 
consuming conditions. 
During the development of utility theory, the effects of contemporary economic and 
social conditions can be traced; and the human behaviors in decision making, supply 
and demand, maximizing the pleasure, etc., can be understood better in modern 
economics. 
The utility of money 
One of the most common use of the concept of utility is the utility of money. In 1937, 
Adam Smith indicated that the term “value” has two different meanings: “value in use” 
and “value in exchange.” Sometimes “value” refers to the inherent utility of a 
particular object, which is the “value in use”; the term “value” also expresses the power 
of purchasing other goods in object conveys, which is the “value in exchange”. This 
concept has been accepted by his immediate successors. Money doesn’t have any 
inherent value (Tang 1993). As people assign value to money, these pieces of paper 
derive the utility from its instrumentality in acquiring other useful objects (Black 1990, 
Lawler 1971). 
Utility theories, such as expected utility theory, is frequently used to explain the 
rational decision making under risk. Prior researchers labeled the modern notion of 
utility as “decision utility” (Kahneman et al. 1997). Within the context of employment, 
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this decision utility is more likely to an employee’s preferences of effort to reach the 
performance targets. Based on the theory of utility, organizational psychologists focus 
on employees’ behaviors to get the maximized monetary outcomes, individual 
performance goals or successful achievement. The utility function for money has been 
developed in decision making processes: in situations where outcomes of choices 
influence utility through gains or losses of money. Many researchers suggested that 
the utility of money reflects a concave in positive limb, and this phenomenon is called 
diminishing marginal utility of money (Jevons 1879, Allen 1933, Giles and Barrett 
1971).  
Cardinal utility and ordinal utility 
In economics, utility can be interpreted as the satisfaction that a person obtains from 
the purchase and use of commodities and services (Kahneman et al. 1997). However, 
there has been some controversy over the issue whether the utility can be measured or 
not. Today utility functions, expressing utility as a function of the amounts of various 
goods consumed, are treated as either cardinal or ordinal. These two concepts are 
proposed to measure the satisfaction of individuals, by analyzing whether the 
satisfaction can be interpreted as providing more information than simply the rank 
order of preferences over bundles of goods.  
Cardinal utility states that the satisfaction that a consumer derives by consuming goods 
and services can be measured with numbers. At one time, it was assumed that the 
consumer was able to say exactly how much utility he obtained from the commodity. 
The economists who made this assumption belonged to the “cardinalist school” of 
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economics. In cardinal utility, it is assumed that consumers derive satisfaction through 
consumption of one good at a time (Bernoulli 1954). Early theorists of utility 
considered that it had physically quantifiable attributes. They thought that utility 
behaved like the magnitudes of distance or time, in which the simple use of a ruler or 
stopwatch resulted in a distinguishable measure. "Utils" was the name actually given 
to the units in a utility scale. When cardinal utility is used, the magnitude of utility 
differences is treated as an ethically or behaviorally significant quantity. For example, 
suppose a cup of coffee has utility of 120 utils, a cup of tea has a utility of 80 utils, and 
a cup of water has a utility of 40 utils. With cardinal utility, it can be concluded that 
the cup of coffee is better than the cup of tea by exactly the same amount by which the 
cup of tea is better than the cup of water. 
Another important issue of cardinal utility is the location of the “zero” value of utility. 
Thus in the above example of coffee, it is not a common conclusion that the cup of tea 
is two thirds as good as the cup of juice, because the quantitative comparison with 
multiple would depend not only on magnitudes of utility differences, but also on the 
"zero" of utility. To be specific, if the "zero" of utility was located at -40, then a cup of 
coffee would be 160 utils more than zero, a cup of tea 120 utils more than zero, and 
the correct conclusion is that the cup of tea is three fourths as good as the cup of coffee. 
The “zero” of utility is regarded as the “reference point,” which is discussed in Section 
3.3.  
Compared with cardinal utility as a quantitative measure, ordinal utility is a qualitative 
measure. Ordinal utility states that the satisfaction that a consumer derives from the 
12 
 
consumption of goods and services cannot be measured in numbers. Rather, ordinal 
utility uses a ranking system in which a ranking is provided to the satisfaction that is 
derived from consumption.  
In cardinal utility, economists considered that the utility had physically quantifiable 
attributes. However, in ordinal utility it is assumed that a consumer may derive 
satisfaction from the consumption of a combination of goods and services, which 
would be ranked according to preference. The differences in utils (values taken on by 
the utility function) are treated as ethically or behaviorally meaningless: the utility 
index encodes a full behavioral ordering between members of a choice set, but tells 
nothing about the related strength of preferences. Ordinal utility functions are unique 
up to increasing monotone transformations. In the above example, it would only be 
possible to say that coffee is preferred to tea to water, but no more. 
Neoclassical economics has largely retreated from using cardinal utility functions as 
the basis of economic behaviors. A notable exception is in the context of analyzing 
choice under conditions of risk. In welfare economics, the concept of cardinal utility 
is often used to aggregate utilities across persons, to create a social welfare function 
(Harsanyi 1953), and the marginal utility theory is developed on the basis of cardinal 
utility, which describes the utility as quantifiable (Kauder 2015). In this study, since 
we measure the satisfaction that the subjects derives from the level of pay change in 
number, and then calculate the size of the threshold of pay raise, the utility of pay 
changes is treated as the calculable one: cardinal utility. 
13 
 
Prospect theory 
Integrating the perspectives of both utilitarian and psychophysical views, prospect 
theory (Kahneman and Tversky 1979, Tversky and Kahneman 1992) was proposed to 
present several modifications and extensions to cardinal utility theory. In prospect 
theory, the empirically derived S-shaped value function is assumed, and it is 
considered that this utility theory function may be more pronounced than previous 
studies (Boettcher 2004, Etchart-Vincent 2004, Schunk and Betsch 2006, Booij and 
Van de Kuilen 2009).  
The utility function described by prospect theory is depicted in Figure 1. Three 
mechanisms of prospect theory are particularly relevant to the study of the utility of 
changes in pay (Tversky and Kahneman 1992, Fennema and Van Assen 1998, 
Abdellaoui 2000). First, the theory suggests the use of reference point to assess gains 
(pay raises) or losses (pay cuts). Reference point, in geometry, refers to a point used to 
define the location of another point. Based on prospect theory, the inflection point in 
the satisfaction function corresponds to the reference point. Choice of the reference 
point is a non-trivial matter because it is a central variable for theory. Second, it 
indicates convex utility on the loss domain and concave utility on the gain domain, 
and derives S-shaped value function, as shown in Figure 1. Moreover, it should be 
steeper for losses than for gains, which means a pay cut of $100 should incur a more 
negative reaction than the positive reaction incurred by a pay raise of $100. Third, 
prospect theory asserts that people prefer certain outcomes over risky outcomes. This 
is called loss aversion, which means people have the tendency to strongly prefer 
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avoiding losses to acquiring gains. 
 Figure 1: Prospect Theory 
Prospect theory can better explain choice behavior because it makes the plausible 
assumption that risk attitudes are not only driven by sensitivity towards outcomes 
(utility curvature), but also by sensitivity towards probabilities (probability weighting), 
and by sensitivity towards whether outcomes are above or below a reference point 
(loss aversion).  
The measurement of utility  
Starting from the mid of the twentieth century, several studies have considered money 
utility (Champlin and Kopelman 1991, Galanter 1990, Giles and Barrett 1971, 
Pleasure or  
Utility 
Pain or  
Disutility 
Losses or  
Pay Cuts 
Gains or  
Pay Raises 
-$100 
+$100 
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Hamblin 1971, Hinrichs 1969, Mosteller and Nogee 1951, Rambo and Pinto 1989), 
which mainly addressed the question of whether or not the marginal utility of money 
will decline with each extra money unit added. Brandstatter and Brandstatter (1996) 
reviewed three empirical approaches to the measurement of utility that prior 
researchers used: (1) the Bernoulli approach to establishing a person's indifference 
(with respect to expected utility) between pairs of lotteries differing in (objective) 
probabilities and values of outcomes; (2) the attitude rating approach by which subjects 
indicate the degree of satisfaction with various pay levels or pay or price rises; (3) the 
psychophysical ratio scaling approach by which ratios of money amounts are equated 
with ratios of intensities of emotions (joy/anger over winning/losing money). 
Specially, as a traditional empirical approach, Bernoulli approach is often used in 
lotteries and gambling settings. Mosteller and Nogee (1951) first applied this approach 
in experiments to measure the utility of money. The experiments were conducted 
among college students and provided support for a decreasing marginal utility of 
money, whereas for national guardsmen increasing marginal utility of money seemed 
appropriate. By establishing a person’s indifference between a sure amount of money 
and a lottery differing in probabilities, the researchers showed that the utility of money 
is a function. The subjects who have low income may be more likely to experience a 
high utility of money, which means the subject who has low emotional stability may 
be more likely to experience a high extroversion and utility (Mosteller and Nogee 1951, 
Brandstatter 1987). 
The attitude rating approach is regarded as a useful measuring device, consisting of a 
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number of statements to which the respondent must express his or her degree of 
agreement or disagreement. Usually, the higher the score, the more favorable the 
respondent's attitude. When measuring the utility of money in the empirical study, the 
particular score is marked by asking the subjects’ degree of satisfaction with various 
pay levels or pay raises, and the total score places the respondent on a continuum from 
least favorable to most favorable. For example, Kapteyn and Wansbeek (1985) 
reexamined the Individual Welfare Function (IWF) through a survey question with 9 
response options (from “very bad” to “excellent”). Depending on the respondent's 
endorsement of each statement, the options ‘excellent’, ‘good’, etc. were translated 
into numbers between zero and one. They concluded that the utility function should be 
assumed to be S-shaped. Similar to the results from Bernoulli approach, the empirical 
results by this approach also support that there exists a relationship between the level 
of income and the marginal utility of the same additional amount of money. In other 
words, the marginal utility should be higher for poor than for rich people under the 
same amount of pay raises. 
With the psychophysical ratio scaling approach, a continuous dependent-response 
rating line about happiness and unhappiness in different sizes of pay changes is used. 
Moreover, the typical survey form has a limitation when subjects rate their perceived 
utility. That is, respondents may scan the questionnaire and familiarize themselves 
with the levels, and fill in the responses with the aim for being consistent when a range 
of pay raises and pay cuts appear in the survey (Worley et al. 1992). Giles and Barrett 
(1971) conceded the same problem in their study, noting that “in responding to a 
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questionnaire of this type, employees might attempt to order the merit increases in 
ascending values and adjust their responses accordingly.” To avoid this problem, Giles 
and Barrett (1971) suggested presenting each increase on a separate sheet of paper or 
using a projector. This approach is psychometrically different from Likert-type pay 
satisfaction measures, and is tied to specific stimulus intensities to generate ratio scales 
(Galanter 1990, Worley et al. 1992). Russell and Bobko (1992) examined the 
properties of continuous dependent-response rating formats and demonstrated that 
they were superior to coarser Likert-type rating scales when researchers attempt to 
detect moderator effects in multiple regression analysis.  
In this study, in order to examine the best fitting utility function, we employ the third 
approach (i.e., the psychophysical ratio scaling approach) to measure the utility of pay 
changes. 
2.2 Pay and Satisfaction 
Management and applied psychology researchers tend to adopt a linear function in the 
study of utility of pay changes, and assume that higher raises are incrementally more 
valuable. Gupta (1980) showed that merit pay raises are positively related to reactions 
such as pay raise happiness and pay satisfaction. Green and Heywood (2008) 
investigated the impact of performance-related pay on several dimensions of 
satisfaction. With the consideration of psychological factors, Schaubroeck et al. (2008) 
examined the role that expected merit pay raises and pay-for-performance perceptions 
play in the relationship between merit pay raises and pay satisfaction. Shaw et al. (2003) 
explored the relationships among merit pay raises, trait positive affectivity (PA), and 
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reactions to merit pay increases (pay attitudes and behavioral intentions). By using 
meta-analysis, researchers also estimated the population correlation between the pay 
level and pay satisfaction. The results suggested that the level of pay bears a positive, 
but quite modest, relationship with job and pay satisfaction (Williams et al. 2006 and 
Judge et al. 2010).  
Some researchers adopted a nonlinear, psychophysical approach and assumed that pay 
raises below a certain threshold may go completely unnoticed. Mitra et al. (1997) 
conducted an experimental simulation and found that 7% is the smallest meaningful 
pay increases (SMPIs) for employees. Mitra et al. (2016) did field tests in both the 
United States and Finland, and identified the smallest meaningful pay increase 
thresholds (5% and 8%, respectively) across behavioral intentions and affective 
reactions. 
Heneman et al. (1997), based on economic theory, suggested that there is a negative 
relationship between the level of income and the marginal utility of the same additional 
amount of money. Back in 1728, the mathematician Cramer postulated that the value 
of money might be a power function of the number of dollars (Bernoulli 1954). Giles 
and Barrett (1971) determined the relationship between merit increases and 
satisfaction, and the results gave the most support to the power function and least 
support to the logarithmic function. However, the philosopher Bernoulli (1954) 
hypothesized that the utility function is logarithmic. Mitra et al. (2015) indicated that 
a quadratic function is the most descriptive to the relationship between the utility and 
pay raise among four functional forms (linear, logarithmic, power, and quadratic) and 
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pay cut is linearly related to the disutility.   
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3 PRELIMINARIES  
In order to find the function that best describes the utility of pay changes, in this section 
we discuss the development of four common utility functions that are considered in 
this study. Based on the literature of psychology and organizational behavior, we first 
assume that the utility function of pay changes has a linear form. As hyperbolic 
absolute risk aversion (HARA) utility is widely used in both empirical and analytical 
studies in economics, finance, and decision theory, we also consider three 
representative function forms of HARA utility, which are quadratic, logarithmic, and 
power functions.  
3.1 Linear Utility Function  
Traditionally, in the fields of psychology and organizational behavior, researchers 
generally assume a linear relationship between two different concepts. Thus, the 
relationship between pay increase and satisfaction is considered as linear. This simple 
relationship is the basic assumption in the study of other complex monetary 
relationships or complicated theoretical structures. For example, Tang et al. (2005) 
examined a mediating model of income and pay satisfaction. A direct path is that 
income is positively related to pay satisfaction. Meanwhile, there is an indirect path in 
the relationship between income and pay satisfaction: income is positively related to 
the love of money, and the love of money is positively related to pay equity comparison, 
then the pay equity comparison is positively related to pay satisfaction. They also 
tested the model across two moderators: culture and gender. In this complex model, all 
the relationships are assumed to be linear. Moreover, the relationship between negative 
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pay changes and individual affective responses is assumed linear as well. For pay cuts, 
Smith (2002) tested the influential theory and found that pay cuts would make workers 
less happy, and thus a linear relationship was assumed. Based on the above studies, the 
relationship between pay change and individual affective reaction (utility) can be 
assumed to have a linear function form, which is presented in Figure 2. 
 
Figure 2: Linear Relationship between Pay Raises/Cuts and Utility 
3.2 Curvilinear Utility Function  
Based on traditional utility theory, a large number of economists have proposed that 
there is a nonlinear relationship between changes in pay and the utility/disutility of 
money. Some of these researchers, especially neo-economists, focus on the change in 
the marginal utility with the change in the level of income. As indicated by Bernoulli 
(1954), a utility function with exponential form for the value of money was postulated 
by the mathematician Cramer in 1728. Moreover, not only the power function but also 
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the logarithmic and quadratic function have been adopted in a series of studies to 
investigate the relationship between merit increases and satisfaction. Figure 3 
illustrates a nonlinear relationship between pay changes and utility. 
 
Figure 3: Curvilinear Relationship between Pay Raises/Cuts and Utility 
Hyperbolic absolute risk aversion (HARA) is the most general class of utility functions 
used in practice. Constant relative risk aversion (CRRA), constant absolute risk 
aversion (CARA), and quadratic utility all exhibit HARA.  
Let X denote the pay levels and Y denote the utility of this pay change. In this study, 
the three common function forms of nonlinear relationship that we investigate are as 
follows: 
1. Logarithmic:         Y = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 × log𝑋𝑋 
2. Power (Nonlinear) with constant:     Y = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1                 (1) 
Power (Nonlinear) without constant:     Y = 𝑏𝑏0 × 𝑋𝑋𝑏𝑏1  
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The non-linear power function without constant can be adjusted as below: 
Power (Log linear) without constant    log𝑌𝑌 = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 × log𝑋𝑋  
It may be noted that the nonlinear power function in Eq. (1) is known as a 
constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility function in economics and is 
widely used in the literature. Thus, we consider the power function form of 
Eq. (1). 
3. Quadratic       Y = 𝑏𝑏0 + 𝑏𝑏1 × 𝑋𝑋 + 𝑏𝑏2 × 𝑋𝑋2  
3.3 Reference Point 
According to cardinal utility theory, it is important to locate the “zero” value of utility. 
Here, the “zero” of utility is regarded as the “reference point”. It is discussed in Section 
2 that the quantitative comparison between the utilities of two objects depends on both 
the magnitude of utility difference and the location of the "zero" of utility. Kahneman 
and Tversky (1979) suggested the employment of reference point is to place a value 
on gains or losses. In this study, we assume that the reference point of utility of pay 
change corresponds to the situation when a person has no psychological change given 
zero change in the pay; that is, the reference point is the origin in Figures 2 and 3. 
Moreover, a person’s base pay could play a significant role in the utility/disutility of 
pay changes. According to prospect theory, the changes in utility should focus on the 
stimulus level. That is, the pay change is a relative concept, which is the comparison 
of the stimulus with respect to the reference point, rather than the absolute cumulative 
or decrease amount of pay level (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). For instance, it is an 
intuitive notion that a person with a current salary of $1,000 would obtain more joy 
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from a pay increase of $1,000 than a person with a current salary of $5,000. 
3.4 Smallest Meaningful Pay Increase 
As discussed previously, empirical studies in economics have investigated the 
curvilinear relationship between pay changes and individual reactions. Bernoulli (1954) 
supported a logarithmic utility function; Giles and Barrett (1971) supported a power 
function; Worley et al. (1992) and Heneman et al. (1997) identified a quadratic or 
inverted-U function. However, these studies paid little attention to the disutility of 
small pay increase. Ernst Weber, a nineteenth-century German scientist, first asserted 
Weber’s law (Champlin and Kopelman 1991, Gescheider 1976): “the change in 
stimulus intensity (ΔΦ) that can just be discriminated is a constant fraction (k) of the 
starting intensity of the stimulus (Φ)” (Gescheider 1976). Mitra et al. (1997) stated that 
there is a threshold on monetary gains as well. Working settings and culture can affect 
the amount of the threshold (Katkowski et al. 2002, Mitra et al. 2016). According to 
Weber’s law and previous studies, we need to consider the situation that a small gain 
may result in disutility.  
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4 METHODOLOGY 
In this study we conduct an experimental simulation to collect data in order to 
empirically study the relationship between pay change and utility. This section 
provides an overview of the methodology adopted in the experiment. We first describe 
the participants, procedures, and the pilot test. We then explain the measurement used 
for capturing the related variables. At the end, we introduce the approach and methods 
applied to the data analysis. 
4.1 Participants 
In our experimental simulation, the final sample consists of 131 students from diverse 
background at a university in Hong Kong, and these students were recruited as part-
time research assistants. These participants include undergraduates and master 
students, and they were recruited through campus posters, email announcements, and 
personal networks from various sources, such as friends, classmates, and roommates.  
Table 1 presents the detailed breakdown of participants’ demographic characteristics. 
Due to missing data and data mismatch for some subjects, the reported data for this 
study are 131 participants’ responses. Among all 131 participants, 17.55% (23) 
were male and 82.45% (108) were female, the participants’ ages ranged from 18 to 26 
and the average age was 21.04 (with SD = 1.79). Regarding the education level, the 
majority of the participants were undergraduate, accounting for 87.79% (115) of the 
sample. A total of 10.68% (14) of the participants were master students, and 1.53% (2) 
participants were PhD students. In terms of birthplace, 44.27% (58) were from 
Mainland China, and 55.73% (73) from Hong Kong.  
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4.2 Procedure 
Gerhart and Rynes (2003) indicated that the experimental simulation study could be 
appropriate for investigating the casual relationship, especially for studies of the 
compensation system. Jenkins et al. (1998) also demonstrated that the effects of 
financial incentives could be best demonstrated in experimental simulations. Thus, we 
adopt the experimental simulation study for this research. 
The participants voluntarily applied to the experimenter to perform a data-coding task. 
They were not allowed to talk with each other or access the Internet in a simulated 
working environment during the whole experiment process. The participants signed a 
consent form before the experiment. At the end of the experimental simulation, they 
were informed about the true purpose of the study (the utility of pay raises/cuts) and 
all participants received a payment of HK$80.  
In the first stage of the experiment, we collected the demographic characteristics of 
participants. The students completed a questionnaire about their background 
information, such as gender, age, education level, and birthplace.  
In the second stage, each participant was required to individually complete a coding 
task which took 30 minutes. At the start of the task, the written instructions were 
distributed to each participant, and the experimenter gave a brief explanation to make 
sure that each individual could understand the task requirements. After the task, the 
experimenter collected the task books and answer sheets. 
In the third stage, we collected the utility data of pay change. The participants were 
required to complete another questionnaire about their individual responses to pay 
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changes. This questionnaire assumed that each participant was hired for this coding 
job for six months at 20 hours per week. The starting payment was HK$80 per hour, 
the average level in the industry. Participants’ payment would be adjusted after 
working for three months. In this questionnaire, participants were asked about how 
satisfied they were with various pay changes (including 15 pay raises, 9 pay cuts, and 
one with “no” pay change), and these pay changes were randomly-ordered to avoid the 
response bias. Specifically, the questionnaire contained the following instructions to 
participants for completing the questions.  
“Assume that we offered you the coding job for six months at 20 hours per week and 
that you accepted. Assume that your starting rate is HK$80 per hour. This booklet of 
questions contains 25 different pay rates, which may be more or less than the starting 
rate. We want to know how you would feel about each pay rate compared to your 
starting pay rate. In other words, tell us how happy you would be with each pay rate 
compared to your starting pay rate. Mark your answer on each page by putting an X 
on the line at the point that corresponds to your feelings.” 
“This can be time-consuming, and we want you to do it quickly. There is no exact right 
answer, so mark each page and move along. You should not go back over the pages. 
We just want your initial reactions.” 
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4.3 Pilot Test 
Before the formal experiment, the experimenters conducted two pre-tests. Three 
students participated in the first pre-test to complete the questionnaires. Based on their 
feedbacks, the experimenters modified the statements of questions to ensure that 
students could fully understand the questions. The demographic questionnaire was also 
modified for a few questions. 
After a week, the second pilot test of the experimental simulation was conducted 
among 7 students (3 male and 4 female). Long duration experiment may lead subjects 
to feel tired and bored, which may reduce the accuracy of the utility measure. 
Therefore, based on these seven students’ feedback, the experimenters redesigned 
some sections of this experiment to ensure that the duration is appropriate and each 
section can proceed smoothly.  
After two rounds of pre-tests, all related documents, such as the consent form, 
demographic questionnaire, and coding task, were made ready for data collection, and 
the final version of the experiment process was confirmed. 
4.4 Measurement 
The participants’ individual responses (i.e., happiness/unhappiness) as a result of pay 
changes were measured by using 100-mm continuous dependent-response rating line. 
In order to collect data for utility of different pay changes, participants were asked to 
compare their new pay level (25 pay levels from HK$60 to HK$130) with their old 
pay level (HK$80 in this experiment), and record their responses with an “X” at a point 
on the line to indicate their degree of happiness (from “very unhappy” to ‘‘no change’’ 
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to “very happy”). As mentioned in the literature review (Section 2), the empirical 
measurement approach used in this study is a traditional psychophysical method. Mitra, 
et al. (1997) developed the approach in their pay raise study. The approach was also 
adopted by Shaw et al. (2003) in their longitudinal study to investigate employees’ 
reactions to merit pay increase. The continuous dependent-response rating line was 
used to assess the employees’ responses. All participants provided their affective 
reactions to the 25 pay levels. Details of these pay levels are shown in Table 2.  
The range of pay changes was chosen for two considerations. Prior studies suggest that 
this range should be sufficiently large to contain the SMPI and should take reasonable 
values in the context of employment. And the use of a length of line to estimate the 
utility may involve two issues. One issue is related to the consistency bias. In a 
common method, participants would be required to give their response to numerically 
presented pay changes. When the utility is also assessed as a numerical measurement, 
it is reasonable for subjects to attempt to maintain consistency between the first and 
second set of numbers, i.e., the pay raise and the direct magnitude-based utility scale 
(Galanter 1990, Galanter and Pliner 1974, Worley et al. 1992). Stevens (2012) 
proposed that a length of line as a direct cross-modality matching technique to estimate 
utility can solve the problem of consistency. Later, other researchers also confirmed it 
(Cross 1982, Giles and Barrett 1971). Moreover, Galanter (1990) and Worley et al. 
(1992) identified that randomly providing different pay changes on each page may 
preclude cognitively consistent, but not necessarily true responses to subjects.  
Another issue is that in this experiment, each participant was required to mark his or 
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her happiness for 25 pay changes, that is, for every pay change, we have the data of all 
participants’ individual utilities. In summary, the continuous dependent-response 
rating format with 25 randomly presented pay levels was adopted in the experiment. 
4.5 Data Analysis and Regression 
The data for this study were 131 subjects’ responses to 25 pay changes and their 
demographic characteristics. We calculated the correlation between each of the three 
demographic dimensions (gender, age, and education level) and utility. 
The responses were analyzed to assess the relative validity of linear, power, 
logarithmic, and quadratic utility functions through regression techniques. Since a 
single function can be used to analyze both pay raises and pay cuts rather than using 
two separate functions for the positive and negative limbs, a single utility model 
involving all pay changes was be considered. 
The positive and negative limbs (i.e., pay raises and pay cuts) can also be analyzed 
separately (Galanter 1990, Giles and Barrett 1971). After we identified the best 
function for the utility model, we also considered the positive and negative limbs 
separately. In order to assess the relative validity of a single utility model and separated 
utility model, the data were analyzed using hierarchical regressions method (Cohen et 
al. 2013).  
Hierarchical regression analysis is commonly used to assess statistical superiority of 
different theoretical models that involve incremental addition of independent variables 
and interactive terms (Cohen et al. 2013). The process comprises of testing statistical 
significance of unique variance associated with incremental addition of a block of 
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variables and, typically, the block of variables that a researcher wishes to control are 
added first. This ensures that the unique variance associated with the variable of 
interest can be clearly identified (Cohen et al. 2013). Thus, as a first step of the 
hierarchical regression we added three demographic variables as the independent 
variables. Gender was regarded as a dummy variable in the model, while age and 
education level were considered as continuous variables. Accordingly, the pay level 
(i.e., the pay change) was added in the second step to examine its effect on the utility. 
Finally, the square of pay change was added to the equation. F-statistic was then used 
to identify the additional variance explained in each step. We used statistical program 
SPSS for our analysis, which uses the change in R2 instead of the change in adjusted 
R2 to report F-statistic for additional variance explained in each step, a practice well 
accepted in the statistical literature (Cohen et al. 2013). Thus, using hierarchical OLS 
regression, it is possible to statistically test the superiority of a quadratic functional 
form compared to a linear functional form. After we identified the best-fit single utility 
model, we used the model to smallest meaningful pay increase. 
 
  
32 
 
Table 1: Demographic Characteristics of Participants 
Dimension  Category  Code  No. of 
Participants 
Percentage  Mean  SD 
Gender  Male  0 23 17.55% .82 .38 
 Female  1 108 82.45%   
Age - - - - 21.04 1.79 
Education 
Level  
Undergraduate 0 115 87.79% 
.21 .55 
 Master in 
Science 
1 7 5.34% 
 Master in 
philosophy 
2 7 5.34% 
 Doctor  3 2 1.53% 
Birthplace  Mainland 
China 
0 58 44.27% 
0.56 0.55 
 Hong Kong 1 73 55.73% 
Note: n=131. 
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Table 2: Pay Changes for the Experiment 
Pay Raises No Change Pay Cuts 
Amount
(HK$) 
Pay 
Change
(HK$) 
% Amount(HK$) 
Pay 
Change
(HK$) 
% Amount(HK$) 
Pay 
Change % 
81 1 1.25% 80 0 0% 79 -1 -1.25% 
82 2 2.50%    78 -2 -2.50% 
84 4 5.00%    77 -3 -3.75% 
85 5 6.25%    74 -6 -7.50% 
88 8 10.00%    71 -9 -11.25% 
90 10 12.50%    68 -12 -15.00% 
92 12 15.00%    65 -15 -18.75% 
95 15 18.75%    62 -18 -22.50% 
100 20 25.00%    60 -20 -25.00% 
102 22 27.50%       
105 25 31.25%       
110 30 37.50%       
118 38 47.50%       
125 45 56.25%       
130 50 62.50%       
Note: The amount of base pay is HK$80. 
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5 RESULTS 
This section presents the findings for a series of analyses conducted in the experiment. 
First, we tested four functional forms for the utility data. Secondly, we calculated the 
correlation between each demographical variable and the utility. Thirdly, we assessed 
the relative validity of the single utility model involving all pay changes, and compared 
it with the separate models for pay raises and pay cuts. Finally, the best-fitting utility 
model that we identified reveals that a sufficiently small amount of pay increase may 
generate a negative value of utility, and we calculated the percentage of the smallest 
meaningful pay increase resulting in non-negative utility. 
5.1 Curve Estimation 
Table 3 shows the results of the curve estimation using regression analyses for subjects’ 
affective reactions. To use logarithmic and power functions, we made a transformation 
on the data first by using the pay level (pay level = pay change + base pay level HK$80) 
as the independent variable. Thus the independent variable takes the values between 
60 (HK$) to 130 (HK$). The dependent variable is the utility, shown by each subject’s 
marked length in 100-mm continuous dependent-response rating line, from 0 (mm) to 
100 (mm).  
Through the statistical program SPSS, R2, F-statistic, p value, the constant and the 
estimated unstandardized parameters are reported for each functional form. We found 
that the quadratic function has the highest R2 value (.663) and is thus superior to the 
other three functional forms. Our results also suggest that the linear function (R2=.628) 
is superior to the power function (R2=.638). In addition, the logarithmic model 
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(R2=.653) is a better fit than the linear function and power function. Therefore, the 
results of curve estimation by SPSS for the four functional forms supports the 
quadratic functional form for describing the utility of pay changes for our data. 
5.2 Correlational Analysis 
A correlation analysis was conducted to examine the impact of social desirability bias 
on the data set and obtain an initial understanding of the relationships among variables. 
In this step, the variable of pay change is the amount of change in pay, from -20 (HK$) 
to 50 (HK$), and the utility is the individual perceived value, from -50 (mm) to 50 
(mm). The calculation results show that the correlation coefficients of the social 
desirability scales to utility range from -.025 to .017. Since the coefficients were all 
below the threshold of .30 as recommended in previous studies (e.g., Mitchell and 
Ambrose 2007), we can conclude that social desirability bias does not cause a 
significant threat to the data. 
Table 4 presents the mean, standard deviation, and correlation calculated for the 
variables. Results of the correlation analysis demonstrated that gender has an 
insignificant negative relationship with the utility of pay change (r = -.025, p > .05). 
Nevertheless, previous research has shown that gender differences could play an 
important role in individual’s attitudes towards money. Women tend to value the social 
needs (e.g. work with people and being helpful to others) more important than men, 
while men tend to consider pay more important than women (Lawler 1971). That is, 
men are more likely to response a higher level of utility than women. Men and 
achievement-oriented employees tend to favor merit pay (Heneman 1992). In our data, 
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the number of females is more than four times of males, which could be a reason for 
the insignificant relationship between gender and utility. On the other hand, Table 4 
indicates that both age and education level have an insignificant correlation with the 
utility of pay change. Therefore, there is no obvious correlation between the 
demographical variables and utility. 
In addition, there is a significant positive relationship between pay change and utility 
(r = .792, p < .001). This relationship is the main focus of the study. Accordingly, 
hierarchical multilevel analysis was used to examine the relationship. 
5.3 Hierarchical Multilevel Analyses  
According to Table 3, we can conclude that for the single utility model, the quadratic 
function is the best fit model for our data among the four common function forms. 
Although the results in Table 4 indicate that demographical characteristics (i.e., gender, 
age and education level) may not have a significant effect on the utility, they can still 
be regarded as control variables and included in the first step of hierarchical 
regressions. Then, the amount of pay change was added in the second step to test the 
linear effect. In the last step, the square of pay change was added to test the quadratic 
effect. F-statistic was then used to identify the additional variance explained in each 
step. The results of hierarchical OLS (ordinary least square) regression for the 
relationship between the utility and pay changes as well as the relationship between 
the utility/disutility and pay raises/cuts are reported in Table 5 and Table 6, respectively. 
Table 5 presents the results of hierarchical regression for a single utility model. For the 
utility of pay change, the results suggest that the addition of a quadratic term can 
37 
 
significantly explain an additional unique variance over and above the variance 
explained by the linear function (∆F =341.439, p<.001). Moreover, the estimated 
unstandardized parameters were reported in Model 3 of Table 5. Thus, in the range of 
our pay changes (from -25% to +62.5% of the base pay), the utility function is concave. 
Our findings supports that the quadratic function is superior to the linear function to 
describe the utility of pay change. The results of separate models for positive and 
negative pay changes were shown in Table 6. We find that, for pay cuts (i.e., the 
negative limb of pay change), Model 2 is significant, whereas Model 3 is not 
significant (∆F =.337, p>.05). Thus the relationship between the utility and pay cut is 
linear, not quadratic. On the other hand, for pay raises (i.e., the positive limb of pay 
change), Model 3 with the variable of square of pay raise has a superior fit to Model 2 
(∆F =57.154, p<.001). In summary, when we examine the best utility functions for pay 
raises and pay cuts separately, we find that the utility of pay raises and that of pay cuts 
are best described by a quadratic function and a linear function, respectively. 
The utility of pay raise and the disutility of pay cut 
Table 6 shows a linear utility on the loss domain and a concave utility on the gain 
domain within the scope of our data (from HK$20 of pay cut to HK$50 of pay raise). 
Many researchers have investigated the utility / disutility of monetary gains / losses in 
the study of the gambling. For example, according to prospect theory, the utility 
function should be concave for gains and convex for losses (Kahneman and Tversky 
1979, Kahneman and Tversky 1992). However, in the employment context, 
psychological factors may affect the utility of pay change. Mitra et al. (2015) 
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conducted an empirical study in a simulated working environment. Their results 
indicated that a quadratic function is the most descriptive to the relationship between 
the utility and pay raise among four functional forms (linear, logarithmic, power, and 
quadratic), and pay cut is linearly related to the disutility. The findings in this study 
support past research. Marginal utility theory for money and reactance theory can 
explain the shape of the utility function in positive limb and negative limb, respectively. 
According to Brehm (1966), reactance theory concerns people’s reactions to the loss 
of behavioral freedom or to the threat of such loss. Mitra et al. (2016) believed that 
individual’s heightened reactions to negative issues occur partly because of the 
following four reasons. First, the negative issues may evoke stronger physiological 
responses than positive issues; secondly, under the negative issues, individual’s 
reactions may focus on how to address the immediate dangers or toxicities; thirdly, 
people seldom expect to meet any negative issues; and lastly, negative events involve 
more cognitive effort (Duffy et al. 2002, Taylor 1991). Thus, the joint impact of under-
met expectations and mobilization effects leads to a linear relationship between 
negative pay changes and subjective assessment. 
For the negative limb, it is asserted that any pay cut, irrespective of its size, results in 
strong negative reaction. This assertion assumes that an employee will show very 
negative reaction to a small pay raise due to the under-met expectation. Thus, the 
disutility resulting from a small pay cut is in part affected by the under-met expectation 
of pay raise. Furthermore, it is well-established that losses loom larger than gains 
(Kahneman and Tversky 1979, 1984). Thus, a pay cut should evoke stronger disutility.  
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A single model or separated models 
A few additional results can be presented from Table 5 and Table 6. When we consider 
the utility function of pay cuts and pay raises separately, the function can be 
represented as follows: Y = f(x) = �f(x−), x < 0f(x+), x ≥ 0 
According to the formulas of R2, we can calculate the R2 value of this piecewise 
function as .378. 
𝑅𝑅2 = ∑(𝑌𝑌1 − 𝑌𝑌�)2
∑(𝑌𝑌 − 𝑌𝑌�)2  
where 𝑌𝑌� refers to the mean of 𝑌𝑌 (utility), 𝑌𝑌1 refers to f(x), and 𝑌𝑌 refers to the real 
value of utility. 
The R2 of a quadratic utility model for all pay changes is higher than the R2 value of 
the piecewise function (.664 vs .378). This result shows that a single utility model 
involving all pay changes has a better fit for the data than two models for pay raises 
and pay cuts separately.  
The smallest meaningful pay increase 
Using the above results of utility models, we did a further analysis of the best fit utility 
function (i.e., the quadratic function) to find the threshold of pay raise. 
In Table 3, for the quadratic function, the estimated parameters are b0=-171.175, 
b1=2.971, and b2=-0.011. The relationship between utility Y and pay level X is given 
as follows: Y = −171.175 + 2.971X − 0.011𝑋𝑋2. 
Since we have applied a transformation before estimating the utility functions, the 
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conversion from pay level back to pay change is necessary when we study the 
characteristics of the utility function of pay change. Let X0 denote the amount of pay 
change and Y the utility of pay change. The equation can be expressed as: Y = −171.175 + 2.971 × (𝑋𝑋0 + 80) − 0.011 × (𝑋𝑋0 + 80)2. 
Thus the relationship between utility and pay change is given as: Y = −2.3607 + 1.2494 × 𝑋𝑋0 − 0.0108 × 𝑋𝑋02               (2) 
with R² = 0.664 and n=131, which is shown in Figure 4. We can see from Figure 4 that 
there is a threshold in pay raises. That is, subjects would feel unhappy when they face 
a “zero” pay raise or a very small pay increase. Letting Y in (2) equal to 0, we can 
calculate this threshold (i.e., the smallest meaningful pay increase) as HK$1.92, which 
is 2.402% of the base-pay level. 
 
Figure 4: The Quadratic Utility Function of Pay Changes. 
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Based on expectancy theory, Lawler and Jenkins (1992) showed that both the amount 
of pay raise and individual’s expectations on the pay raise may affect his/her reaction 
to the pay increase. A person’s expectation to the pay raise can be influenced by 
complicated factors, such as the base pay level, the performance appraisal standards, 
and other’s pay raise. For instance, an employee may have an expected magnitude of 
a merit pay raise, and thus a smaller-than-expected raise could produce an experienced 
disutility or negative affective reaction. Thus, according to expectancy theory, ‘‘actual 
pay raises’’ that are less than ‘‘expected pay raises’’ could evoke disutility or negative 
reactions. Recent work on experienced utility seems to support the need for this 
refinement. Carter and McBride (2013) suggested that at least three factors influence 
an individual’s reference point: past outcomes, expected outcomes, and outcomes 
received by the peer-group. Furthermore, prior research described that not only the 
past outcomes, but also the social comparison process may impact the individual’s 
expectations to a pay raise (Elster, 2000, Milkovich et. al. 2011). To summarize, pay 
raise expectations play a critical role in determining the affective reactions of pay 
raises, and it is reasonable that small pay raises may evoke negative affective reactions.  
We note that a quadratic function is unimodal. Using the quadratic model in (2), we 
can calculate the extreme point for the utility of pay change as HK$57.84 (i.e., 72.3% 
of base pay). The utility is increasing in pay change before this point, but is decreasing 
after this point. Since the maximum pay raise in our study is HK$50, smaller than this 
extreme point, we do not need to consider the extreme point of utility function in the 
study.  
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5.4 Summary  
In summary, a number of conclusions can be drawn from our results. (i) The quadratic 
function best fits the relationship between the utility and pay change than other three 
common functional forms including the linear, logarithmic, and power functions. (ii) 
Through separate hierarchical multilevel analyses for pay raises and pay cuts, we 
showed that quadratic and linear functions are the most descriptive of the positive and 
negative limbs, respectively. (iii) A single quadratic utility model involving all pay 
changes has a better fit for the data than two models for pay raises and pay cuts 
separately. (iv) The best-fit utility model reveals that a sufficiently small amount of 
pay increase may generate a negative value of utility, and this percentage of smallest 
meaningful pay increase is calculated to be 2.402% of the base-pay level. 
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Table 3: Regression Results of Individual Responses to Pay Levels 
Equation Model Summary Parameter Estimates R2 F df1 df2 Sig. Constant b1 b2 
Linear .628 5523.318 1 3273 .000 -80.449 .951  
Logarithmic .653 6169.922 1 3273 .000 -387.258 87.638  
Quadratic .663 3218.425 2 3272 .000 -171.175 2.971 -.011 
Power .638 5762.867 1 3273 .000 -171.058 .436  
Note: n = 131. Independent variable: pay level, dependent variable utility. 
 
 
 
Table 4: Correlations and Descriptive Statistics 
Variables  Mean SD 1 2 3 4 5 
1. Gender  .824 .381 - -.202** .027 - -.025 
2. Age  21.046 1.786  - .583*** - .004 
3. Education level .206 .548   - - .017 
4. Pay change 8.040 18.512    - .792*** 
5. Utility  3.303 22.224     - 
Note: n = 131. 
* p < .05 
** p < .01 
*** p < .001 
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Table 5: Hierarchical Multilevel Analyses for Utility of Pay Change (Involving all 
Data of Pay Changes) 
Predictor Utility of pay change Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(constant) 9.403 1.755 3.739 
Gender  -1.753 -1.753* -1.753** 
Age  -.233 -.233 -.233 
Education level 1.183 1.183* 1.183* 
PC(Pay change)  .951*** 1.249*** 
PC2   -.011*** 
∆R² .001 .628 .035 
AdjR² .000 .629 .664 
R² .001 .629 .664 
∆F 1.303 5536.010*** 341.439*** 
Notes: n = 131. 
* p <.05,  
** p<.01, 
*** p<.001 
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Table 6: Hierarchical Multilevel Analyses for Utility of Pay Change (Pay Cuts and 
Pay Raises Separately) 
Predictor 
Utility of pay change 
Negative limb Positive limb 
Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
(constant) 4.406 15.455* 15.888* 11.628* -.488 -2.660 
Gender  -1.054 -.931 -.935 -1.971* -2.115** -2.192** 
Age  -.997** -.984** -.984** .216 .200 .192 
Education level 2.741* 2.735** 2.735** .298 .305 .309 
PC(Pay change)  1.200*** 1.346***  .703*** 1.116*** 
PC2   .007   -.009*** 
∆R² .008 .247 .000 .003 .441 .015 
AdjR² .006 .252 .252 .002 .443 .458 
R² .008 .255 .255 .003 .445 .459 
∆F 3.271* 387.807*** .337 2.409 1662.883*** 57.154*** 
Notes: n = 131. 
 * p <.05,  
** p<.01, 
*** p<.001 
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6 DISCUSSION 
This section consists of two parts. First, we discuss the theoretical contributions and 
practical implications of our findings. Then, we discuss the limitations of this study, 
and provide the directions on further research.  
6.1 Contributions and Implications  
Our research has a number of contributions to the literature. First, this study provides 
an empirical evidence about the specific relationship between utility and pay change 
in the context of employment. Previous studies have proposed a nonlinear utility 
function, such as the logarithmic form, the power form (Giles and Barrett 1971, 
Stevens 2012, and Brandstateer and Brandstateer 1996), and the quadratic form or 
inverted-U function (Heneman et al. 1997, Mitra et al. 2015). Our study provides 
additional experimental evidences for the curvilinear utility function.  
Secondly, our results offer a support for the decreasing marginal utility of pay change 
in the reasonable range of pay levels from 75% to 162.5% of the base pay, and the 
quadratic function is a best fit to our data. Concave utility in the pay raises means that 
a pay raise of $200 does not yield twice the benefit that a pay raise of $100 does. The 
findings confirm previous research with respect to the decreasing marginal utility of 
pay raises (Layardy and Nickellx 2006). However, no prior study has jointly 
considered pay cuts and pay raises to investigate a best fit utility function form in the 
context of employment. We found that the change in utility for all pay changes can be 
described by a single utility function, and the utility function is shown to be concave. 
Our third contribution is that the results highlight the problems inherent in small pay 
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raises, revealing the disturbing effects of small pay raises. In both work and non-work 
settings, prior studies rarely considered the influence of a very small pay raise on 
subjects’ reactions to monetary changes. All previous studies on monetary gains in the 
economics literature assumed that positive gains would always have a positive utility. 
We demonstrated that small gains can have disutility, which represents a logical 
extension, namely, the identification of stable SMPI thresholds. 
Our findings also have implications to the practice. It is important for managers to 
recognize that very small pay raises may cause disappointment, rather than be 
perceived as a reward. The finding is consistent with the research on the smallest 
meaningful pay increases (Mitra et al. 1997, Champlin and Kopelman 1991, Mitra et 
al. 2016, Worley et al. 1992). In the working settings, the allocation of monetary 
increase presumably enhances employees’ motivation, performance, and retention 
(Heneman 1992). Unfortunately, with the economic crisis or low inflation, companies 
may have small budget increases, and little growth often means that there is little merit 
money to distribute. Even so, companies continue to allocate merit raises. Our finding 
points to a problem with this approach. If cognitive recognition of pay raises does not 
even occur until pay raises reach about 2 per cent of the base pay, then smaller raises 
may not evoke any positive cognitive and behavioral reactions. 
6.2 Limitation and Future Work 
First of all, the composition of the sample of participants may limit the generalizability 
of our results in this study. In order to empirically test the specific utility functional 
forms, we conducted an experimental simulation. In the simulated working 
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environment, various realistic factors were controlled, and we could get desirable data 
for employee reactions to pay raises and pay cuts. However, this may not be feasible 
in field settings, and a complex set of organizational factors may influence employees’ 
reactions to pay changes. Moreover, the compensation structure is more complicated 
in the working settings. Laboratory studies, on the other hand, involve the issues of 
generalizability to reality.  
Base pay  
In our experimental simulation, the pay structure was simple and there was only one 
base pay level. In our results, the smallest meaningful pay increase is approximately 
2.4% of the base pay level. Previous studies indicated that an increase of about 5–8% 
of the base pay level can be regarded as meaningful (Mitra et al. 1997, Mitra et al. 
2016, and Worley et al. 1992). The magnitude of SMPI in the previous studies is two 
to three times larger than our result. One possible reason is that our experimental 
simulation where subjects are paid real money differs from the complex field contexts. 
The duration of work and the frequency of payoff (i.e., hourly or monthly) may 
influence individual responses to pay changes. Future research can investigate the 
impact of base pay level on the magnitude of SMPI.  
Performance and performance feedback 
Performance-based pay change is the second direction for future research. In recent 
years, organizations have increasingly adopted performance-based compensation 
schemes. Hewitt Associates (2005), an American provider of human capital and 
management consulting services, reported that 47 percent of more than 1,000 
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companies surveyed had incentive systems where rewards were based on specific 
employee performance criteria. In addition, the performance-related pay has attracted 
great attention from academics. Extant publications have provided insights into the 
effects of pay level, merit pay, and performance on satisfaction. Merit pay is 
significantly associated with employee motivation, performance, and satisfaction (e.g., 
Gerhart and Rynes 2003, Green and Heywood 2008, and Bassett 1994).  
Different types of performance feedback may lead to different levels of expected pay, 
and influence people’s subjective value of pay changes. However, little research has 
studied the impact of performance feedback on the utility of pay changes.  
Individual differences  
Individual differences are often ignored in the study of pay satisfaction, or perceived 
value (i.e., utility) of pay changes. For example, the concept of attitudes towards 
money can be involved in the relationship between pay change and utility. Extant 
studies generally considered money attitudes as a psychological factor, but seldom 
associated it with the reactions to pay changes. As found by Roznowski and Hulin 
(1992), jobs that provide good income may be satisfactory to some individuals, but 
people with fewer material desires may not find money particularly satisfying. Tang et 
al. (1997) indicated three major components of money attitudes: affective (Good and 
Evil); cognitive (Achievement, Respect, and Power); behavioral (Budget). People with 
different levels of money attitudes have different patterns of pay satisfaction 
(Roznowski and Hulin 1992). The affective, as an important component of money 
attitudes, plays a major role in the relationship between pay level and pay satisfaction. 
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Other researchers (e.g., Pfeffer and Langton, 1993 and Tang et al. 2005) also indicated 
that the love of money moderates the income-pay satisfaction relationship. For high-
love-of-money individuals, the relationship between income and pay satisfaction was 
positive and significant, however, for low-love-of-money individuals, the relationship 
was not significant. And they also argued the high- and low- love-of-money regression 
lines intersected at a point. Therefore, our future research can investigate whether 
individual differences, such as the love of money, mediate the relationship between 
pay change and utility. 
6.3 Conclusion  
We conducted an experimental simulation to investigate the relationship between pay 
changes and utility. We evaluated four functional forms including linear, quadratic, 
power, and logarithmic functions, and found that a quadratic function best fits the 
utility of pay change including reasonable pay raises and pay cuts. We also showed 
that a single utility model is preferred over two separate models for pay raises and pay 
cuts. In addition, we calculated the smallest meaningful pay increase and discussed its 
practical implications.  
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